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Since laws are hierarchically organized, according to this worldpicture, knowledge advances either by deduction or by induction. In the first case, new propositions are deduced from previously accepted laws. These new propositions are considered confirmed when their terms can be linked to objects or events, and the relationships between these objects or events can be shown empirically to correspond to relations between the terms of the proposition. In the second case, objective and undistorted observations of associations between discrete objects or events are noted. These associations are scientifically explained only if they can be shown to be particular cases following under more general laws. According to the Formalist and Reconstructionist worldpicture, inductions developed from raw data will meet deductions developed from yet more general propositions creating ultimately a unified hierarchical system of knowledge.
Both Formalists and Reconstructionists
have confidence that a universal denotative language such as mathematics or logic can further the growth of scientific knowledge. Mathematics and logic allow a community of scientists to achieve consensus on the validity of scientific propositions. Observational language, another specialized type, reduces sentences used in ordinary speech to sentences that can be verified by direct observation. For example, the sentence "The bear frightens me" can be transformed into "The sight of the bear is associated with the beads of sweat forming on my brow and the trembling of my hands." One of the objectives of Formalists and Reconstructionists is to unite logic and mathematical sentences with observational sentences through "correspondence rules" (see Carnap, 1936 Carnap, , 1937 ), e.g., if A (bear), then B (beads of sweat), and C (trembling hands).
The Formalist and Reconstructionist worldpicture is an inadequate basis for generating knowledge about organizations and more particularly for developing problem-solving methods if one adapts the following perspective on organizations.
1. Organizations are artifacts created by human beings to serve their ends. Organizations obey laws that are affected by human purposes and actions. In this sense, they do not exist independently of human beings, like the planets, just waiting for an Isaac Newton of organizational theory to discover an equivalent of the laws of planetary motion. 
Pragmatists and Pragmaticists differed from Formalists and
Reconstructionists in not believing that any worldpicture was a necessary foundation for scientific inquiry. They believed that claims to knowledge were legitimized not by their relationship to an underlying reality but, rather, by the norms and rules of inquiry itself which are themselves open to rational criticism. Peirce (1 955) characterized the pragmaticist criterion of truth as the ideal limit of the ultimate opinion of an indefinite community of investigators.
Anglo-linguists did not believe that a universal denotative language such as mathematics or logic could be united with observational language through correspondence rules. Although a Formalist, Hempel (1950) did not believe this either. He and the Anglo-linguists rejected the exclusive use of specialized languages for scientific inquiry. The Anglolinguists pursued their investigations with language in everyday use.
Although Pragmatists, Pragmaticists, and Anglo-linguists avoid the difficulties that Reconstructionists and Formalists create for organizational research by support of their worldpicture or by the search for correspondence rules between types of language, we find all positivist approaches to science (P.S.) to be deficient in their capacity to generate knowledge for use by members of organizations for solving the problems they face. The following arguments explain this deficiency. P.S. assumes that its methods are value neutral. As Habermas (1971) points out, knowledge and human interests are interwoven, as reflected in the choice of methods and the ends toward which such methods are put. The primary criteria of confirmation for P.S. are prediction and control of its objects of study, whether they be human or otherwise. When the objects of study are human, methods based on deception and manipulation are not uncommonly used to assure that the experimenter will get the results he or she predicted. It is not too difficult to translate the word "experimenter" into that of "manager" to see the moral implications of extrapolating methods and ends from the "laboratory" to the organization. Habermas pointed out that unless we reflect on the ends to be served by science, we may unwittingly find that prediction and control and its attendant methods will exclude other ends such as improved understanding among persons and the release of human potential. 585/ASQ P.S. treats persons as objects of inquiry, even though they are subjects or initiators of action in their own right. Humans differ from objects in their capacity for self-reflection and their ability to collaborate in the diagnosis of their own problems and in the generation of knowledge. P.S. eliminates the role of history in the generation of knowledge. Individuals and organizations are not born in an instant with their present structures and functions intact. Rather, present patterns of behavior can many times only be understood as the product of shared definitions held by organizational members regarding what their common endeavor is about. These definitions may have evolved from the unique history of a particular organization, its periods of exceptional performance, the psycho-social defenses of its members, its prior leaders, etc. P.S. assumes that a system is defined only to the extent that a denotative language exists to describe it. However, any representational system is always less than the actual system leaving the practicing manager to rely on intuition, hunch, interpretation, etc. P.S. generally acknowledges that such methods can be precursors to scientific knowledge, but it does not consider them by themselves to be legitimate scientific methods. As Polanyi (1958) has pointed out, such methods generate "tacit knowledge." Rather than poor substitutes for articulation, such methods encourage a deeper understanding of organizational values, encourage consideration of new organizational forms, and facilitate recognition of clues to the new forms the organization might take. P.S. is itself a product of the human mind, thus knowledge of the inquirer cannot be excluded from an understanding of how knowledge is generated. If a human's consciousness, worldviews, language, etc., are a product of the history of ideas as well as of social and economic development, then a social science model that ignores this product will ratify the past rather than help to create a better future.
Our view is that action research is a mode of inquiry more congenial to the perspective on organizations we characterized above and avoids the deficiencies of positivist science for generating knowledge for application to. organizational problems.
ORIGINS OF ACTION RESEARCH
The term "action research" was introduced by Kurt Lewin in 1946 to denote a pioneering approach toward social research which combined generation of theory with changing the social system through the researcher acting on or in the social system. The act itself is presented as the means of both changing the system and generating critical knowledge about it. Action research had a parallel but independent development in Britain during the same years that Lewin was formulating his ideas. It began with a World War 11 group which later formed the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations. This interdisciplinary group drew more on psychoanalysis and social psychiatry than on social and experimental psychology, as did Lewin. But like Lewin, the group was committed to the social engagement of the social sciences, both as a strategy for advancing fundamental knowledge and as a way of enabling the social sciences to contribute solutions to important social problems. One of the group's first projects was the civil repatriation of prisoners of war. Twenty transitional communities were designed partly on data contributed by the repatriated prisoners and partly on the results of the experiments (Wilson, Trist, and Curle, 1952) at Northfield, a military psychiatric hospital with self-governing wards, in which pioneering group therapy techniques were developed by Bion (see Bion, 1946; Bridger, 1946) . Subsequently, the Tavistock Institute has broadened its original medical orientation to action research by focusing on engagement with large-scale social systems (see Trist, 1976 To the aims of contributing to the practical concerns of people and to the goals of social science, we add a third 587/ASQ aim, to develop the self-help competencies of people facing problems.
Foster (1972) suggested that the two aims of action research in the Rapoport definition be sought through the process of changing the problem situation itself. The small face-to-face group is the primary medium through which the problem situation may be changed, as well as in which the interests and ethics of the various parties to this process may be developed "within a mutually acceptable ethical framework." An infra-structure of ad hoc and permanent face-to-face groups is generally developed within a client system to conduct action research. A client system is the social system in which the members face problems to be solved by action research. It may be one of the face-to-face groups, an organization, a network of organizations (Trist, 1977) , or a community. While Rapoport's definition of action research focuses on aim, action research can also be viewed as a cyclical process with five phases: diagnosing, action planning, action taking, evaluating, and specifying learning. The infra-structure within the client system and the action researcher maintain and regulate some or all of these five phases jointly (Figure) .
We consider all five phases to be necessary for a comprehensive definition of action research. However, action research projects may differ in the number of phases which are carried out in collaboration between action researcher and the client system. Chein, Cook, and Harding (1948) use the term "diagnostic action research" when the researcher is involved only in collecting data for diagnosis and feeding the data back to the client system. Chein, Cook, and Harding use the term "empirical action research" when the researcher only evaluates the actions undertaken by the client system and feeds data back to it. They use the term "participant action research" when diagnosing and action planning are carried out in collaboration between researcher and client system. Finally, they use the term "experimental action research" when researcher and client system collaborate in all 
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or nearly all phases to set up an experiment for taking an action and evaluating its consequences. . Action researchers with any of these backgrounds may also retrieve data from the records, memos, and reports that the client system routinely produces.
ACTION RESEARCH AS A CORRECTIVE TO THE DEFICIENCIES OF POSITIVIST SCIENCE
Six characteristics of action research provide a corrective to the deficiencies of positivist science we discussed earlier.
These characteristics are representative of the methods and objectives of key developers and practitioners of action research (A.R.).
A.R. is future oriented. In dealing with the practical concerns of people, A.R. is oriented toward creating a more desirable future for them. Human beings are therefore recognized as purposeful systems (Ackoff and Emery, 1972) the actions of which are guided by goals, objectives, and ideals. In being future-oriented, A.R. has close affinities to the planning process, so that planning research may be potentially useful in informing A.R. and vice versa.
A.R. is collaborative. Interdependence between researcher and the client system is an essential feature of action research, and the direction of the research process will be partly a function of the needs and competencies of the two. On the one hand, A.R., as Cherns, Clark, and Jenkins (1976: 33) state, "challenges the position of the social scientist as privileged observer, analyst, and critic." On the other hand, it prevents him from taking the role of disinterested observer and obliges him to clarify and represent his own ethics and values so that they, along with those of the client system, can serve as guidelines against which to assess jointly planned actions.
A.R. implies system development. The action research process encourages the development of the capacity of a system to facilitate, maintain, and regulate the cyclical process of diagnosing, action planning, action taking, evaluating, and specifying learning. The aim in action research is to build appropriate structures, to build the necessary system and competencies, and to modify the relationship of the system to its relevant environment. The focus is on generating the necessary communication and problem-solving procedures. The infrastructure of the system, which the action 589/ASQ research generates, is the key instrument for (1) alleviating the immediate problematic situation, and (2) generating new knowledge about system processes.
A.R. generates theory grounded in action. In action research, theory provides a guide for what should be considered in the diagnosis of an organization as well as for generating possible courses of action to deal with the problems of members of the organization. This is the case for psychoanalytic theory, Lewinian field theory, and general systems theory (see Susman, 1976) . Furthermore, A.R. contributes to the development of theory by taking actions guided by theory and evaluating their consequences for the problems members of organizations face. Theory may then be supported or revised on the basis of the evaluation.
A.R. is agnostic. The action researcher recognizes that his or her theories and prescriptions for action are themselves the product of previously taken action and, therefore, are subject to reexamination and reformulation upon entering every new research situation. The action researcher also recognizes that the objectives, the problem, and the method of the research must be generated from the process itself, and that the consequences of selected actions cannot be fully known ahead of time.
A.R. is situational. The action researcher knows that many of the relationships between people, events, and things are a function of the situation as relevant actors currently define it. Such relationships are not often invariant (Blumer, 1956) or free of their context, but can change as the definition of the situation changes. Appropriate action is based not on knowledge of the replications of previously observed relationships between actions and outcomes. It is based on knowing how particular actors define their present situations or on achieving consensus on defining situations so that planned actions will produce their intended outcomes.
IS ACTION RESEARCH SCIENTIFIC?
One criterion of positivist science for judging whether action research is scientific is whether relationships between actions and their consequences can be explained as particular cases falling under more general laws governing types of actions and their consequences. If relationships between actions and consequences can be explained in this way, then the action researcher will know what action to take in future settings by reference to types of actions having lawful relationships to consequences. "Covering law" is the term which Hempel (1965) , a leading contemporary philosopher of the Formalist school, applied to a general law which explains a particular case by "covering" or subsuming it. Covering laws are the basis for the only two kinds of explanation that Hempel considered as meriting the label of being scientific; that is, the deductive-nomological and the inductive-statistical forms. In terms of organizational action, the deductive-nomological type of explanation has the following form: (a) Actions of typeA always produce consequences of type C in a given class of situations, (b) Person X takes action A in a particular situation, thus (c) A consequence of type C occurs. In a deductive-nomological expla-590/ASQ nation, sentence (a) must state a general law about the consequences of human action, while (b) cites a particular fact or event. Sentence (c) (the explicandum) is derived from sentences (a) and (b) (jointly the explicans). Sentence (a) is considered to be a strictly universal form. It asserts that in all cases in which certain specifiable conditions are realized, the action A implies consequence C (that is, the outcome is certain to occur).
The inductive-statistical type of explanation asserts that if certain specifiable conditions are realized, then a particular event will occur with a certain statistical probability. Inductive-statistical explanations have the following form: (a') The likelihood that a consequence of type C will follow action of type A, is some value L, (b') Person X takes action A, thus (c') A consequence of type C will occur with a particular likelihood.
The value of L is not any particular mean of a sampling distribution that represents a long-run frequency with which events of type A are followed by consequences of type C. Rather, it refers to the "degree of rational credibility" (Carnap, 1950) or logical inductive probability which sentence c', the explicandum possesses relative to sentences a' + b', the explicans.
Hempel considered the deductive-nomological model the more desirable, since it provides a higher degree of certainty in the explanation of events. Furthermore, if the explicans precedes the explicandum in time, the model is called a causal model (Evered, 1976) . On the other hand, the inductive-statistical model is superior in that any single falsified prediction will not invalidate the explanatory model, as it would for the deductive-nomological model.
Although most contemporary organizational research uses the inductive-statistical model of explanation, Hempel considered it less desirable than the deductive-nomological on these grounds: (1) It cannot predict an outcome with certainty; (2) It cannot explain why any unpredictable outcome has actually occurred, and is therefore, strictly speaking, a noncausal model; (3) Statistical regularity does not allow one to make a specific choice in a concrete situation; and (4) Statistical regularities do not explain why two kinds of events or things are strongly associated.
Although Hempel believed that the logic of all scientific explanations is of the covering-law variety, he did not believe that all empirical phenomena were scientifically explainable or that they are all governed by a system of determinable laws. He acknowledges that there are other ways by which we may explain why some thing or event exists or happens; he just would not call them scientific explanations. On the other hand, he considered it the task of the philosopher to determine together with the scientist whether or not these other forms of explanation could be translated into coveringlaw terms and be tested. Hempel did not believe we could determine which explanations were scientific a priori.
We will now examine whether actions and their consequences can be subsumed under covering laws, thus permitting them the status of scientific explanation by positivist criteria.
Status of an Action as a Thing or Event
The search for generalizations about the relationship between actions and consequences is ill-conceived if actions are assumed to have a meaning independent of their associations with the outcomes they are intended to produce. Unlike behavior that follows a caused event, i.e., the man trips over a crack in the sidewalk (Anscombe, 1958, change agent who reads the report of such a study still has to make an intervention in the one organization in which he or she had been invited to intervene. His or her chosen action would be judged good or poor, right or wrong in the singular concrete setting in which it was undertaken. He or she does not intervene in 50 organizations so as to judge whether the chosen action produced the desired outcome at better than the chance level, e.g., in 40 organizations out of 50 rather than in 25 out of 50. Reliance on Bayesian notions of subjective probability of success may have limited value. Any system as complex as a social system has a unique configuration of parameters which was not measured, but which would influence where the organization might fall in the sampling distribution. Thus, the intervener without knowledge of the unique configuration of parameters in the concrete setting in which action is contemplated would not know if an action will produce an outcome at the mean of the sampling distribution or perhaps three standard deviations from it. Without such knowledge, the chosen action may produce an outcome that is less desirable than an outcome chosen on the basis of good judgment of the relevant factors in the concrete setting.
Actions Are Seldom Discrete Events Some thought should be given as to what kinds of human actions can be considered interventions into an organization.
An intervention may be construed as a cause when members of a supra-system or other system take actions to alter the internal or external conditions a targeted organization faces without consultation with members of the targeted organization. The interventions of concern to this discussion are acts of communication between two or more selfreflecting subjects, requiring mutual understanding of the meaning of the acts and common consent as to their presumed consequences. Such interventions have an element of surprise or unexpectedness to them so that they are unlike other actions routinely undertaken within the organization. The meaning of the routine actions is understood because they fit in the context created by a history of previous commitments affecting the goals, structure, and technology of the organization and the language and definitions of situations that led to these commitments.
The element of surprise evoked by an intervention results when the change agent offers members of the target organization a new way to conceptualize an old problem and offers it in a language or framework that differs from that by which members of the organization define their present situation (Susman, 1976 Its most important contribution to action research is its concept of the hermeneutical circle. The idea of the circle is that no knowledge is possible without presuppositions. This idea has been recognized also by philosophers not associated with hermeneutics as, for example, in Popper's (1959) acknowledgement that the framing of any scientific question assumes some foreknowledge of what it is we want to know. In the social sciences, the hermeneutical circle takes the form of attempting an initial holistic understanding of a social system and then using this understanding as a basis for interpreting the parts of the system. Knowledge is gained dialectically by proceeding from the whole to its parts and then back again. Each time an incongruence occurs between part and whole, a reconceptualization takes place. The learning process is not unlike the spiral formulated by Lewin. The frequency of reconceptualization decreases as the match improves between the researcher's conception of the social system and that held by its members. The hermeneutical tradition strengthens the action researcher's methodological position by forewarning him that his interpretation of a social system will never be exactly the same as that held by the members of the social system. This provides the action researcher with a base for understanding his own preconceptions better and by contrast, those held by system members, and also allows him to see possible solutions not seen by system members.
Existentialism. Action research has much in common with existentialism. Both arose out of concern with the limitations of rationalistic science, both assert the importance of human choice and human values, both are keyed to the importance of human action, and both avoid giving traditional causal explanations of human actions.
The existential viewpoint was first articulated by Kierkegaard in the 1840s and Nietzsche in the 1870s, and systematically 595/ASQ developed by Heidegger, Sartre, and Jaspers, among others (see Reinhardt, 1952; Barrett, 1958 Reliance on an empirical base alone for explaining behavior can lead an observer to search for a cause of an action taken. When an empirical base is used, changes in behavior are sought through manipulation of the cause of the behavior instead of through the consent and understanding of those whose behavior is to be changed. Trist, Susman, and Brown (1977) have commented that the language and metaphors used by organizational researchers reveal that organizational change is conceptualized as externally caused. Change is often described with energy metaphors, as if it were a force aimed at those parts of an organization the researchers wish to displace while holding other parts of the organization constant.
From a phenomenological perspective, behavior is understood by knowing the ends toward which the action is taken, as well as by sharing the same time frame and universe of moral concerns.
Prediction versus making things happen. Positivist science encourages two conceptions of the researcher's role in prediction in organizational science: (1) the researcher is sole possessor of knowledge from which actions will be drawn and (2) the researcher is sole originator of actions to be taken on an essentially passive world. The degree to which these conceptions are at variance with taking action within a social system is evident from the extraordinary precautions undertaken in many controlled experiments to ensure that human beings will react to the researcher's treatment rather than to the researcher as another human being.
The action researcher, on the other hand, coproduces (Ackoff and Emery, 1972) solutions through collaboration with the client system. Friedmann's (1 973) concept of trarisactive planning provides a basis for synthesizing the contributions that action researcher and clients can bring to solving a problem. The action researcher brings theoretical knowledge as well as breadth of experience to the problem-solving process. The clients bring practical knowledge and experience of the situations in which they are trying to solve problems. Neither client nor researcher has better knowledge; in a sense, they are both experts.
According to positivist conceptions, once the researcher predicts that an outcome will follow taking a particular ac-5971ASQ tion, he or she then takes the action and waits to see if the predicted outcome occurs. Any interference by the researcher in the events that intervene between action and outcome nullifies the significance of the prediction. The action researcher collaborates with clients in diagnosis, selection of alternative actions, and evaluation of outcomes. The objective of the collaboration is to bring about a better future, i.e., with a problem solved. The values that guide the client's choice of goals and objectives are ones with which the action researcher becomes "directively correlated" (Sommerhoff, 1969) to increase the relevance of his or her contributions. If the researcher is effective in such circumstances, the hoped for outcome will occur because of the researcher's involvement not from trying to avoid it.
Deduction and induction versus conjectures. Peirce (1955) Collaboration between the researcher and the client system enlarges the domain of inquiry in organizational research from them to us. The knowledge we generate affects us not others; the researcher is necessarily a part of the data he or she helps to generate.
A CONTINGENCY VIEW OF SCIENCE The Table summarizes the differences between positivist science and action research we have discussed. As we have seen, the differences are extensive. We now consider the question of which approach is better. Our answer is that it all depends on the phenomena one wants to study and the conditions under which they are to be studied. It would be very difficult to state definitively when positivist science is appropriate. However, like Vaill (1976) who questions the use of positivist science ("the expository model of science") for designing organizations, we suggest that the researcher ought to be skeptical of positivist science when the unit of analysis is, like the researcher, a self-reflecting subject, when relationships between subjects (actors) are influenced by definitions of the situation, or when the reason for undertaking the research is to solve a problem which the ac- However, in action research, the ultimate sanction is in the perceived functionality of chosen actions to produce desirable consequences for an organization. Action research constitutes a kind of science with a different epistemology that produces a different kind of knowledge, a knowledge which is contingent on the particular situation, and which develops the capacity of members of the organization to solve their own problems.
We hope that this article will enable others to assess the scientific merits of action research. We believe that action research is both ascientific in terms of the criteria of positivist science and relevant in terms of generating good organizational science. As a procedure for generating knowledge, we believe it has far greater potential than positivist science for understanding and managing the affairs of organizations.
